From "Kill the Gays" to "Kill the Gay Rights
Movement": The Future of Homosexuality Legislation in Africa Adam J. Kretz * I. INTRODUCTION ¶1 This article serves to examine three diverse ways in which African nations are currently considering and implementing legislation with regard to sexual minorities, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex individuals. At one extreme, but nearest to the median position amongst nations on the continent, sits Uganda, which has undertaken an attempt to increase criminal penalties not just for those who engage in homosexual acts, but also to criminalize activities in civil society that "aid and abet" 1 LGBT persons-defined by the aptly-named Anti-Homosexuality Bill to include renting a room to "known homosexual individuals" or participating in a demonstration advocating for gay rights. 2 Uganda would be the first country on the African continent to go to this extreme a form of criminalization. At the other extreme sits Malawi, in which the country's popular President, Joyce Banda, has signaled a desire to suspend and eventually repeal its colonial-era ban on same-sex sexual activity. 3 In the middle sits Zimbabwe, in which a recent push to protect the rights of LGBT persons in the nation's new constitution instead resulted in a strengthening the country's anti-homosexuality laws. 4 
¶2
In addition to describing the processes and phenomena that led to these three forms of legislation regarding homosexuality, this article attempts to situate how these laws fit within the broader historical context of the regulation of same-sex sexual activity. 5 This 209 conservative positions are paramount. Their successes, and the international exposure tied to their work on the Anti-Homosexuality Bill, has already encouraged copycat legislation throughout Africa. Furthermore, the fact that their public standing has not suffered despite the failure of the Bill in several successive parliamentary sessions has only encouraged legislators to take similar positions for political advantage.
¶5
In contrast, Malawi's now-aborted push to decriminalize homosexuality would have made it one of only a handful of nations in Africa in which same-sex sexual activity is legal, and it would have been the first state since South Africa to actively reverse an antigay law. Though its push failed, Malawi's attempt to improve protections for its
LGBT citizens mirrors myriad similar attempts around the globe, and serves as an interesting case study for future pushes in Africa and abroad. ¶6 Zimbabwe, by contrast, saw a leader of the governing coalition, Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangarai, push to include sexual orientation as a protected status in the new Zimbabwean constitution, only to be thwarted by his governing partners, resulting in the codification of criminal penalties for homosexuality in that very constitution. This leaves LGBT Zimbabweans worse off than they were before Tsvangirai's affirmative push. These two failed attempts at providing minimal protections for LGBT persons position Malawi and Zimbabwe within the broader historical trajectory of gay rights efforts, and provide a lens by which we can better understand how legalization of same-sex activity can interact with this trajectory in complex ways.
II. BACKGROUND: THE LEGAL STATUSES OF LGBT PEOPLE IN AFRICA ¶7
The variety of legal strictures placed on LGBT persons by the fifty-seven nations in Africa could not be more disparate. At one end is South Africa, which became the first nation in the world to constitutionally ban discrimination based on sexual orientation in its post-apartheid constitution, 8 and then, in 2006, became just the fifth nation in the world to legalize same-sex marriage. 9 At the other end, two countries, Sudan and 8 See S. AFRICA CONST., 1996 at ch. 2, sec. 9(3) prohibiting discrimination "on one or more grounds, including…sexual orientation." For a broader discussion of the drafting of the post-apartheid Constitution, and the rights-based approach taken by its adopters, see generally Indeed, rights by their nature will atrophy if they are frozen. As the conditions of humanity alter and as ideas of justice and equity evolve, so do concepts of rights take on new texture and meaning. The horizon of rights is as limitless as the hopes and expectations of humanity. What was regarded by the law as just yesterday is condemned as unjust today. When the Universal Declaration was adopted, colonialism and racial discrimination were seen as natural phenomena, embodied in the laws of the so-called civilized nations, and blessed by as many religious leaders as they were denounced. Patriarchy, at least as old as most marriage systems, defended as being based on biological fact and which was supported by many a religious leader, is no longer accepted as the norm, at least in large parts of the world. Severe chastisement of women and children was tolerated by family law and international legal instruments then, but is today considered intolerable. Similarly, though many of the values of family life have remained Mauritania, punish homosexuality by death. 10 Despite this range of legal statuses, the vast majority of African nations have legislated against homosexuality, with penalties ranging from fines, 11 to corporal punishment, 12 to prison terms of varying lengths, 13 and, finally, the aforementioned death penalties. 14 In all, homosexuality is illegal in thirty-five countries; six additional countries have banned male homosexual activity while legalizing same-sex sexual activity between two women. 15 In only fifteen African nations is homosexual activity not explicitly barred by law: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Madagascar, the Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, and South Africa. 16 
¶8
Though forty-two countries have banned homosexuality, the actual codification of these antigay laws takes myriad forms. In many of these countries, the prohibition on homosexual activity dates to colonial penal codes; British colonial laws banning homosexuality remain on the books in nearly two-dozen nations. 17 Though Britain itself constant, both the family and the law relating to the family have been utterly transformed. Fourie, at ¶ ¶ 99-101. 10 In Sudan, Article 148 of the nation's 1991 penal code established the punishment of death for homosexual activity -for men, the death penalty attaches after a third offense, and for women, it attaches after the fourth offense. THE PENAL CODE OF 1991, art. 148 (Sudan). For both sexes, one thousand public lashes is the punishment for a first offense, which can be for actions as minor as kissing. Id. In Mauritania, Article 306 of the Criminal Code criminalizes homosexual activity "for any Muslim man who commits an impudent act against nature," which has been interpreted to include same-sex sexual activity, and for which the punishment is death by stoning. PENAL CODE OF 1984, art. 306 (Mauritania). However, a 2009 report by the United States embassy describes "[to the best of our awareness, there have been] no case ever being prosecuted under the anti-homosexual laws." See Embassy of the United States at Nouakchott, Mauritania, Mauritanian Law and Practice Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (Dec. 27, 2009), http://cables.mrkva.eu/cable.php?id=241691. Homosexual activity has further been outlawed by regional governments throughout the continent, most notably in twelve northern states of Nigeria, which have adopted death by stoning as the penalty for male homosexual activity. See Gay Nigerians face Sharia death, BBC AFRICA (Aug. 10, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6940061.stm. 11 See, e.g., PENAL CODE ORDINANCE 66-156 OFJUNE 8, 1966, art. 338 (Algeria) ("Any person guilty of a homosexual act shall be punished with . . . a fine of between 500 and 2,000 Algerian dinars."). 12 See, e.g., PENAL CODE OF 1945, art. 138A (Tanzania) (amended by the SEXUAL OFFENCES SPECIAL PROVISIONS ACT OF 1998, § 138A (Tanzania)) ("[Upon commission of certain offences] the offender shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not less than ten years, with corporal punishment."). 13 See, e.g., PENAL CODE OF 1913, art. 230 (Tunisia) (" [S] odomy that is not covered by any of the other previous articles is punished with imprisonment for three years."). 14 This list of possible punishments is non-exhaustive. Several nations and governmental bodies have established other unique punishments for homosexuals. For example, a conviction for homosexual activity in Somaliland results in expulsion from the country rather than a prison sentence. See 21 In July 2012, the Liberian Senate voted to constitutionalize a ban on same-sex marriage, though President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who had vowed to the international community that she would veto any legislation increasing penalties for homosexual activity, vetoed the bill. Liberian Senate Votes to Ban Gay Marriage in Constitution, RADIO NETHERLANDS WORLDWIDE AFRICA (July 20, 2012), http://www.rnw.nl/africa/bulletin/liberian-senate-votes-ban-gay-marriage-constitution. 22 Godwyns Onwuchekwa, coordinator for the UK-based group Justice for Gay Africans, ascribes some of the blame for what he terms this "worsening situation" on the continent to increased activity by United States-based evangelical Christian organizations. See Chothia, infra note 55; see also Kron, infra note 60 (discussing the U.S.-based Fellowship organization and its relationship with David Bahati, author of the Uganda Anti-Homosexuality Bill). 23 The move from criminalization to social integration tends to occur in fits and spurts, as opposed to following a linear progression. Empirically, in nations where homosexual activity is illegal and vilified, a willingness by LGBT persons to engage in visible, identifiable advocacy-both individually and within activist organizations-has proven to be a critical impetus for legal advancement. For a discussion of the increased visibility of LGBT persons after the Stonewall Riots in the United States, and the development of early gay and lesbian political organizations such as ACT UP! and The Mattachine Society, see DAVID CARTER, STONEWALL: THE RIOTS THAT SPARKED THE GAY REVOLUTION (2010 TOGO, art. 88 (2000) (enacting a heavy fine for "imprudent acts or crimes against nature with an individual of the same sex"). Even this law allows a judge to impose, in addition to the fine, a prison term ranging from one to three years. No African nation, as of 2013, has enacted a criminal ban on same-sex activity without also attaching the possibility of jail time to that ban. See generally Itaborahy, supra note 15. 27 Of the nations mandating prison terms for those convicted of homosexual activity, the minimum penalties in Egypt, Mauritania, and Somalia -three months-are the lowest on the continent. See Itaborahy, supra note 15, at 27, 32, 35 (describing the nations' statutes). 28 See, e.g., BANKOLE THOMPSON, CRIMINAL LAW OF SIERRA LEONE (1999) (describing section 61 of the 1861 Sierra Leone Offenses Against the Person Act, which includes a maximum penalty of life imprisonment for "buggery," defined to include same-sex sexual intercourse); THE PENAL CODE OF 1991, art. 148 (Sudan) (allowing for life imprisonment upon an individual's third conviction for same-sex activity); SEXUAL OFFENCES SPECIAL PROVISIONS ACT OF 1998, sec. 154(1)(c) (Tanzania) (allowing for up to life imprisonment for any male convicted under the statute). 29 The full list of African countries includes: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Comoros, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See, e.g., Itaborahy, supra note 15, at 12. difficult to engage with those who are similarly "otherized." The common "us versus them" rhetoric utilized by politicians attempting to garner popular support for anti-LGBT policies can be seen most clearly in the actions of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and Ugandan politicians David Bahati and Rebecca Kadaga, who consistently describe LGBT people and their allies as though they are not fully human, let alone full citizens entitled to the rights and privileges afforded "normal" Africans.
¶12
Stage 3: Decriminalization. The United Nations and International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) describe decriminalization of homosexual behavior as the first true step toward establishing equal treatment, both under the law and within society. 30 For many LGBT rights advocates, decriminalization is the primary objective of current campaigns across Africa. 31 Across much of the current decriminalization movement, international organizations are working alongside nascent domestic LGBT rights groups to foment pressure on public officials and improve visibility of and respect for sexual minorities. 32 
¶13
The United Nations, under the leadership of Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, has launched appeals for the worldwide decriminalization of homosexuality, focusing in particular on encouraging African nations to revise the statutory prohibitions of same-sex conduct in their penal codes. 33 African nations have taken an affirmative step toward granting any form of positive rights to LGBT citizens: South Africa, which by law bans all forms of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender expression, and four countries-Mauritius, Seychelles, Botswana, and Mozambique-which ban some forms of antigay discrimination. 42 
¶15
Stage 5: Establishment of Positive Rights. Though this is only the third-highest level of status conferral for LGBT people, the only nation on the African continent that can be appropriately defined as having conferred any positive rights upon its LGBT citizens is South Africa. 43 Such rights could include any benefits granted to a similarly situated non-LGBT person or couple, such as inheritance rights, power-of-attorney, or tax benefits. 44 The move from solely preventive legislating, which includes antidiscrimination, to the establishment of positive rights is a pivotal one, as it begins the process of fully integrating LGBT persons into the broader socio-cultural fabric of a nation.
¶16
Stage 6: Full Legal Equality. At this stage, legal distinctions between LGBT and non-LGBT persons are eliminated. South Africa's constitution, and its interpretation in various cases before the country's Constitutional Court permitting adoption rights, full marriage rights, and some rights for transgender persons, among myriad other rights, nearly fits it within this stage. Though South Africa comes close to this stage, it does not quite reach it-section 9 of the South African Constitution and its anti-discrimination codes do not fully protect gender identity in the same manner as sexual orientation. 45 
¶17
Stage 7: Cultural Integration. This is a stage that no country in Africa has reached and still eludes even the most LGBT-friendly nations around the world. 46 Beyond laws on 42 See Itaborahy, supra note 15. These laws in general do not provide de facto protection against the day-today homophobia that individuals can experience in the workplace. Id. 43 See generally Fourie, supra note 9; see also S. AFRICA CONST., 1996, supra note 8, sec. 9(3) (prohibiting discrimination based on one's sexual orientation). 44 One type of law that straddles these two lines is hate crimes legislation, which amplifies penalties for those convicted of violent crimes against a person targeted because of his or her sexual orientation or gender identity. 45 "Gender identity" is not explicitly protected in section 9(3) of the South African Constitution, though the document does separate out "gender" from "sex," allowing for protections for one's gender even if that gender does not line up with the manner one's sex physically presents. S. AFRICA CONST., 1996, supra note 8. 46 This definition does not mean that a single instance of antigay violence, in a nation that has otherwise given LGBT people full and equal rights under the law, would preclude a nation from being seen as having reached Stage 7. Despite its incredible progress on legal equality, much of South Africa remains virulently homophobic, with widespread evidence of hate crimes, including corrective rape, against LGBT persons, particularly outside of the major metropolitan areas. The widespread violence LGBT people face in South Africa, however, prevents it from moving from legal equality to cultural integration. See Liz Hazelton, Raped for Being Gay, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2055289/Corrective-rape-South-Africa-women-attcked-cure-lesbians.html (describing the horror of the phenomenon of "corrective rape" in South Africa); see also Charlayne Hunter-Gault, South Africa the books, this stage is one in which LGBT people are full members of the country's social fabric. 47 This is not to say that to reach this stage a country need have no instances of prejudice against LGBT persons, but that instances of violence or marginalization would be widely decried, and those who perpetrated such actions would be both prosecuted and publicly shamed.
¶18
Most of the nations of the world fall within the first three stages 48 -where LGBT persons lack any positive rights. Most of the nations in Africa fall within a smaller band, only the first two stages, where an LGBT person risks fines, corporal punishment, or jail, simply because of their identity. Further, until 2012, African nations remained relatively entrenched within their respective stages. The various attempts by Uganda, Malawi, and Zimbabwe are some of the very first endeavors by African nations to move between stages-Uganda and Zimbabwe downward, and Malawi upward, and serve as helpful examinations of this seven-stage framework and the relative ease of mobility between the stages.
B. Cultural Context: Pervasive Social Hostility Toward
LGBT People ¶19 Vilification and social marginalization of LGBT people is commonplace across the African continent, even in nations that have decriminalized homosexuality and instituted anti-discrimination measures. Few LGBT people are open about their sexual orientation or gender identity; those that are often find themselves the targets of violence and public shaming, 49 along with, all too often, murder. 50 Many in Africa view homosexuality as a "western invention" imposed upon them by the remnants of colonizing powers. 51 Confronts Corrective Rape, THE NEW YORKER (May 28, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/05/28/120528fa_fact_huntergault (quoting the director of a transgender rights group in Cape Town who states that her organization alone responds to thirty cases of corrective rape per week in Western Cape Province. Western Cape constitutes only 11 percent of South Africa's total population.). 47 Relatively homogenous nations that have instituted full legal equality, such as Iceland, tend to have fewer reported instances of anti-LGBT violence and marginalization. Not only did Iceland pass same-sex marriage by unanimous vote, the first nation to do so, it also has an openly lesbian prime minister and a dearth of recorded antigay crimes. 49 This public shaming often includes explicit calls to action, not just encouraging violence, but also social marginalization. See, e.g., Cameroon Group Urges Parents to Denounce Gays to the Police, BANCABC NEWS ZIMBABWE, http://www.bancabc.co.zw/news/cameroon-group-urges-parents-to-denounce-gays-topolice.aspx ("We urge parents to publicly denounce gays, even their own children . . . [Gays] have stopped [public expressions of homosexuality] since we began a public campaign against them."). For a discussion of the ways in which Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe has engaged in public shaming and vilifying of LGBT people, see infra, Part III.C. ¶20
Disapproval of homosexuality on the continent is pervasive. A recent survey for the Pew Global Attitudes Project puts disapproval of homosexuality at greater than 90 percent for many nations on the continent, with Mali (98 percent), Senegal (97 percent), Nigeria (97 percent), Uganda (95 percent), and Egypt (95 percent) showing particularly high levels of disapproval. 52 Even a majority of South Africans, 64 percent, agreed with the Pew Research statement that homosexuality should be disapproved of by society. 53 Substantial societal disapproval is the main reason why South Africa has made most of its progress on LGBT issues through its constitution and subsequent interpretations by the Constitutional Court, rather than through bills passed through parliament. Even the Civil Union Act of 2006, which passed parliament overwhelmingly, was demanded by the Constitutional Court in Fourie as the necessary remedy for failing to provide same-sex marriage rights. Though South Africa serves as a beacon for end-result laws affording
LGBT equality, its emphasis on constitutional, rather than legislative, rights guarantees has insulated it from the populist antigay fervor that has overwhelmed LGBT activists in many other nations considering parliamentary changes.
¶21
Political leaders have also stoked antigay attitudes beyond mere legislatingantigay rhetoric imbues speeches, press statements, and discussions of all manner of public policy. 54 Factions that otherwise engage in virulent disagreement unite over what 50 The murder of activist David Kato, an outspoken gay activist and openly gay man living in Uganda, occurred after his name, photo, and address were published in a local periodical alongside the headline "Hang Them!" The article accused the gay men of "raiding schools and recruiting children [to homosexuality]," a widespread belief in Uganda. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Ugandan Who Spoke Up for Gays Is Beaten to Death, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/world/africa/28uganda.html?_r=1&. Within two months of the paper's publication, Kato was bludgeoned to death in his home. Public activists are not the only targets, however. In South Africa, Thapelo Makuthle, an openly gay man living in Northern Cape, a province that has seen "growth and increased visibility of the gay community," was found hacked to death, his head nearly severed, in a targeted antigay crime. Makuthle's murder followed the shooting death of a young lesbian woman who refused the advances of a man at a local bar. they view as the "problem of homosexuality." 55 This fervor has allowed groups that otherwise focus their energy on marginalizing one another to instead work together to "otherize" a common enemy. The secrecy with which many LGBT persons feel compelled to live their lives impedes the creation of vibrant LGBT-controlled and LGBTfriendly spaces. 56 Once "out," many are forced from their homes and communities. 57 Those able to depart, yet who remain in Africa, often find themselves in situations just as bad as those they just left.
LGBT refugees, particularly in southern Africa, have been victimized by continual and extreme antigay violence, including a refugee man locked in his home and set on fire in a camp in Uganda after other refugees learned of his sexual orientation, and two women who were abducted from a refugee camp in Uganda not because they themselves were gay, but merely for assisting LGBT refugees who had recently come to the camp. 58 ¶22
It is in these cultural contexts that we now turn to an analysis of legislation in three African nations-Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Malawi-to explore three possible paths that sexual orientation legislation can take on the African continent. Each presents unique challenges for LGBT persons and their allies, and each mirrors legislation that has taken place during the broader global human rights push to decriminalize homosexuality throughout the past several decades.
III. EXAMINING THREE APPROACHES TO HOMOSEXUALITY LEGISLATION IN 2012 ¶23
Attempts by any African nation to regress or progress in its legal treatment of LGBT persons are unique. That three nations did so in 2012, and all in disparate manners, allows for a comparative treatment of not only the means by which those laws were discussed and undertaken, but also the ways in which such laws have served, and could serve in the future, as models for other similar pieces of legislation across the continent.
When politicians can push these laws and improve their public standing, regardless of whether or not they actually pass, legislators in other countries take notice. In many nations, this is a one-way ratchet-leaders will improve their standing and support only by fighting against the rights of LGBT persons. Leaders fighting for LGBT equality, or even just minimal legislative improvements in the lives of LGBT persons, will have to be popular enough to withstand the public backlash attendant with taking such a position.
A. Uganda's "Bootstrapping Down": Criminalizing Both the Gay and the Pro-Gay ¶24
Between 2000 and 2012, Uganda experienced a stark regression in its legal protection for LGBT persons. What makes this regression all the more surprising is where Uganda began-prior to 2000, male-male homosexual activity was banned by law, but would result, at most, in a short prison sentence and small fines, and female-female homosexual activity was not illegal, though it was met with severe social stigma. Revisions of the nation's penal code in 2000 made all homosexual activity illegal and punishable by life imprisonment. 59 Uganda's full criminalization, and its attendant prison terms for LGBT persons prosecuted by the law, made the country one of the most repressive places in the world for antigay laws.
¶25
Uganda remained in this position for a mere nine years. In 2009, a backbencher parliamentarian named David Bahati, in his first term as Member of Parliament and with deep ties to conservative religious officials in Africa and the United States, introduced a private member bill that would, by its terms, make Uganda the most unwelcoming place for LGBT persons, or anyone harboring support for LGBT persons, in the world. 60 His Anti-Homosexuality Bill of 2009, 61 colloquially described in the press as the "Kill the Gays Bill," 62 had several provisions: first, it strengthened punishments for those convicted of engaging in homosexual activity; second, the law introduced the death penalty for "aggravated homosexuality," which included a second violation of the ban on same-sex activity and any sexual encounter with a minor, disabled person, or any sex act engaged in by a person who was HIV-positive; 63 third, it criminalized anyone who "aids, abets, counsels, or procures another to engage of acts of homosexuality," punishable by up to seven years in prison. 64 63 See Anti-Homosexuality Bill, Part II(3)(1) (a)-(g), supra note 1. Though many in the media focused on the "uniqueness" of this punishment, the terms of the 2009 Bill would only have aligned Uganda with the countries in Africa that already permitted the death penalty for homosexuality, and would not go as far as some nations which permit death upon the first offence. 64 Part II(7) of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill created a seven year penalty for anyone falling under this broad definition, while Part II(14) made it a crime for any person occupying "a position of authority" for failing to disclose the offense to the police within twenty-four hours. Though it failed to pass, Bahati's bill served to foment large-scale public campaigns against LGBT people and their allies. In October 2010, the Ugandan newspaper Rolling Stone (not to be confused with the eponymous, and far more famous, American-based periodical) published the photos and names of what it called "100 known homosexuals." 69 Those named soon found themselves victimized through public harassment and violence. Many fled the country. 70 But at least one was not as lucky. David Kato, one of the most public faces of the nascent Ugandan LGBT community, was found hacked to death in his home just three months after the newspaper published his photo. 71 The Rolling Stone publisher responsible for the headline, Giles Muhame, reporting requirement are large. Additionally, Parts II(11) and II(13) would penalize landlords who simply rented rooms to someone known to be homosexual. 65 Part II(13) of the Bill outlined five ways in which a person could be found to have engaged in the "promotion of homosexuality," including "fund[ing] or sponsor[ing] homosexuality or other related activity" or "us[ing] electronic devices . . . for purposes of homosexuality or promoting homosexuality." See Anti-Homosexuality Bill, supra note 1. 66 Even discomfort with the death penalty clause was not enough to deter support from the Bill. See Uganda Debates Death Penalty for Gays, MSNBC (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34331632/ns/world_news-africa/t/uganda-debates-death-penaltygays/#.ULfhN5gRZSU (citing the country's ethics minister, James Buturo, who "said the death sentence clause would probably be reviewed but maintained the law was necessary," and local shopkeepers John Muwanguzi, who stated, "I feel the bill is good and necessary, but I don't think gays should be killed. They should be imprisoned for a year and warned not to do it again. The family is in danger in Uganda because the rate at which vice is spreading is appalling."). Museveni appeared to add his backing earlier this month, warning youths in Kampala that he had heard that 'European homosexuals are recruiting in Africa,' and saying gay relationships were against God's will. 'We used to say Mr and Mrs, but now it is Mr and Mr. What is that now?' he said."). 69 See Gettleman, supra note 50 (describing the paper's publication, including the use of the phrase "Hang Them!" in large block letters next to the photos of the 100 gay and gay-friendly individuals, many of whom, as private citizens, did not engage in LGBT activism). 70 For a personal narrative of one such escape, see Demetri Levantis, Gay Ugandan Flees to New Zealand Over Death Threats, GAY STAR NEWS (July 2, 2012), http://www.gaystarnews.com/article/gay-ugandanflees-new-zealand-over-death-threats020712 (telling the story of Steven Kasiko, one of the 100 Ugandans included in the Rolling Stone publication). 71 In media outside the country, the murder was called a hate crime, and the reason for the attack was outright acknowledged to be Kato's sexual orientation. In Uganda, police insisted it was a robbery. Despite insisted that the publication was not designed to incite violence, despite the emphatic "Hang Them!", and instead was meant to urge "authorities to investigate and prosecute people recruiting children to homosexuality." 72 ¶28
Bahati's bill did not stay dead for long. Recognizing its political popularity, Uganda's Parliament, this time under the leadership of Speaker Rebecca Kadaga, took up a version of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill in late 2011. 73 The bill remained substantially similar to the one introduced by Bahati in 2009, with one glaring exception-the removal of the death penalty as a possible punishment for those convicted of aggravated homosexuality. 74 The maximum penalty under the new law would instead be life imprisonment, and the draft legislation still called for varying lengths of imprisonment for the other violations included in Bahati's original bill-including the "aiding and abetting" sections, bans on renting to LGBT people, and the mandatory reporting requirements, which demand that individuals who become aware that an acquaintance, friend, or neighbor is homosexual report that person to the authorities, or otherwise be charged themselves with a felony. Every provision that still precluded a person from taking actions that would help LGBT people, let alone advocate on their behalf, retained a criminal penalty. 75 Kadaga cited public outcry from the failure to pass the bill in previous sessions as motivating the end-of-year push, and promised to deliver its passage "as a Christmas gift" to supporters. 76 Her public support argument did not itself lack merit-thousands of antigay activists took to the streets to protest homosexuality in the nation and encourage action by Ugandan lawmakers. 77 Ugandan citizens questioned by the international press often expressed agreement with the general goal of the antigay legislation, invoking the widespread belief that gays were attempting to "recruit" local youths into homosexuality. 78 ¶29 Kadaga's outspoken support of the Bill moved the draft law off of the backbench and onto the fast track toward passage. Her well-founded belief that the Bill "reflects the will of a majority of the Ugandan people," 79 combined with the public support of members of Museveni's Cabinet and various religious leaders 80 and the dearth of organizations, both in the country and exerting pressure internationally working against the law, 81 makes passage through Parliament all-but-assured. Even though the Bill failed to pass before Christmas, the Anti-Homosexuality Bill has been introduced and "fasttracked" in each parliamentary session since 2009, making activists fear that passage could happen rapidly and at any time. 82 This would result in devastating consequences for Uganda's LGBT population, severely hampering the ability of activists to engage in attempts to change the views of Uganda's population, 83 further entrenching antigay attitudes, and creating a framework for antigay officials in other nations, around Africa and the globe, to pass similar laws. Though actual passage of such laws would prove easier in nations with deep-seated anti-LGBT beliefs, the AHB could also be modeled in nations without an antigay majority, as Kadaga and Bahati's experience has shown that parliamentary success is not necessary for a subsequent increase in public stature for politicians who oppose LGBT rights. LGBT activists dared to declare their pride in public events this weekend."). Such public celebrations would certainly be illegal if the AntiHomosexuality Bill were to pass.
LGBT people are virtually invisible at present; the Bill would make that invisibility actual.
B. Malawi's Surprising Move Toward Decriminalization ¶30
Malawi, like Uganda, can trace its legal ban on homosexuality to its Britishinstalled penal code. 84 Malawi has banned male-male sexual activity, and it was only recently, in 2011, that the country expanded that ban to also include female homosexual acts. 85 Three independent sections of Malawi's 1930 Penal Code have been interpreted to ban homosexuality, though the word itself is absent from statute. Section 153 prohibits "unnatural offenses," which courts now interpret to prohibit both male-male and femalefemale sexual activity. 86 Nearly all of these laws use the same language, banning "carnal knowledge against the order of nature," which was widely understood in Britain to mean anal intercourse. Id. This definition helps explain why some former British colonies in Africa retain bans on male-male intercourse and not female-female sexual activity. 85 One of President Mutharika's final acts in office was to sign a statutory ban on same-sex activity between two females. 86 LAWS OF MALAWI: PENAL CODE, Cap. 7:01, § 153 (1930). Section 154 further criminalizes "attempt[s] to commit any of the [unnatural offenses]," which can be interpreted to further marginalize gay men by criminalizing activity that, while not sexual, could be interpreted as possibly leading to sexual activity. Id. at § 154. Thus, "attempt[ed]" homosexuality is punishable by up to seven years in prison, a sentence that includes the possibility of corporal punishment, as opposed to the fourteen-year sentence for anyone who actually commits a simple "unnatural offence." Id. 87 This "gross indecency" law does not include a definition differentiating it from the "unnatural offences" provision, but we can infer that it would include any sexual activity between two males (as the law ignores female-female activity) other than anal intercourse. See id. at § § 153(a), 156. Such acts are subject to up to five years imprisonment with the possibility of corporal punishment. Id. at § 156. Monjeza and Chimbalanga did not attempt to marry, and were arrested a mere two days after making a public announcement that they would engage in a symbolic wedding ceremony in the hotel where Chimbalanga worked as a janitor. Id. Much of the international press surrounding the case referred to both Monjeza and Chimbalanga as gay men, referring to both as "he," however Chimbalanga identifies as a woman, and, while born a biological male, Chimbalanga was living as a woman upon her arrest. Id. For a critique of the press's insistence on referring to the couple as "gay," see Natacha Kennedy, Once Again, the "T" in LGBT is Silenced, GUARDIAN (May 22, 2010, 11:00 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/22/malawian-transgender-identity/print ("There has convicted under Section 153. 91 Both were sentenced to fourteen years in maximumsecurity prison, the harshest sentence possible, after the presiding judge announced in court that he wished to make an example out of them. 92 After a strong international outcry, 93 then-President Bingu wu Mutharika pardoned the two young people during a visit from United Nations Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon, but used his pardon statement to further degrade and otherize LGBT persons. 94 Despite the international outcry and subsequent pardon, the general public strongly approved of Monjeza and Chimbalanga's convictions. There were further police crackdowns not only on LGBT persons, but also on those that supported them-in January 2010, a Blantyre man, Peter Sawali, was arrested for putting a sign on his property that read "Gay rights are human rights." 95 ¶32
Mutharika unexpectedly died of a heart attack in early 2012, elevating his VicePresident, Joyce Banda, to the Presidency. Banda, who came to prominence in 1999 as the country's first Minster for Gender and Community Services while spearheading Malawi's first Domestic Violence bill, 96 was viewed by many human rights organizations as a forward-thinking reformer. Less than one month after taking office, in May 2012, Banda surprised even those who viewed her as such a reformer by calling, in her first public speech, for repeal of Malawi's ban on homosexuality. 97 From its beginning, Banda's push was path-breaking; Malawi would be the first nation to decriminalize homosexual acts since South Africa did so in 1998. 98 Other African nations where samerightly been an international outcry in response to the couple's barbaric treatment, but the protest has been against the perceived homophobia of Malawi's law courts. The problem is, however, that one half of this couple does not primarily identify as gay."). As I am sympathetic to Kennedy's broader point, and for purposes of accuracy, I will refer to Chimbalanga using female pronouns. 91 Their conviction helps showcase just how broad the ban on homosexual activity can be. Monjeza and Chimbalanga were not seen engaging in any public displays of sexual activity nor did they actually attempt to marry. In court, they in fact denied having sexual intercourse, upon which the court demanded they submit to humiliating physical examinations to "prove" they had violated Section 153. sex activity is not prohibited simply lack laws against it and have not affirmatively decriminalized.
¶33
Banda's statement received substantial praise in the international community, from world leaders and human rights organizations alike. 99 Nevertheless, many within Malawi expressed outrage and the hope that she would reverse her decision. After considerable public pressure, including a concerted lobbying campaign from Malawian religious organizations, Banda later reversed herself, stating that, "anyone who has listened to the debate in Malawi realizes that Malawians are not ready to deal with that right now." 100 Outside observers were surprised by Banda's backtrack; despite the unpopularity of the bill with church leaders and many in the general public, reports noted that Banda had support from a majority of MPs. 101 As of October 2012, Banda had abandoned any attempt to legislatively repeal sections 137A, 153, 154, and 156. ¶34
It therefore surprised much of the international community when reports surfaced in early November 2012 that Malawian Justice Minister Ralph Kasambara had announced a suspension of arrests and prosecutions for male homosexuality. 102 The suspension, according to Kasambara, would prevent government embarrassment. He stated "If we continue arresting and prosecuting people based on the said laws and later such laws are found to be unconstitutional it would be an embarrassment to government . . . It is better to let one criminal get away with it rather than throw a lot of innocent people in jail." 103 Though the policy was consistent with President Banda's wishes, Kasambara's rationale itself made little sense. Prosecutions under the law in Malawi were already rare, and there is no evidence that those described by Kasambara as "innocent"-people not engaged in same-sex activity-had ever been tried under the statutes. 104 Further, Malawi's constitutional court has not been reluctant to find other laws passed by Parliament to be unconstitutional, making Kasambara's fear that striking down the law would prove "embarrassing" or serve to delegitimize the government in some way seem unfounded, or at the very least something that would have already occurred. 105 
¶35
Less than one week later, mirroring President Banda's walk-back of her first attempt to decriminalize homosexuality, the Malawian government again backtracked, this time vehemently denying Kasambara's statements to the international press. 106 These denials, again, were caused by pressure from the conservative Christian community, in particular one group: the Malawi Council of Churches, a group of twenty-four conservative churches with long ties to lawmakers and government officials. 107 Public statements of these churches, beyond merely describing homosexuality as "foreign" and "un-African," have also fomented nationalist and anti-western views among the populace by arguing that Banda's move to decriminalize homosexuality is merely another ploy to entice foreign leaders and western investors to do business in the country. Additionally, the Malawi Law Society, an organization of practicing lawyers and legal scholars, denounced the move, stating that "only parliament has the power to suspend laws . . . No minister can verbally or over a written memorandum suspend the application of the law." 108 
¶36
For now, Malawi's laws remain on the books, with little chance for legislative repeal. It remains to be seen whether, despite confusion over Justice Minister Kasambara's statement, police will continue active prosecution of those in violation of Sections 153 and 156.
C. Zimbabwe's Constitutional Revision ¶37
Zimbabwe has various overlapping laws, all of which independently prohibit samesex sexual activity. In its common law, Zimbabwe bans sodomy, which it ¶38 defines as "unlawful and intentional sexual relations . . . between two human males," 109 as well as what it terms "unnatural offenses," defined as the purposeful commission of "any unnatural sex act by one person with another person," 110 thereby functionally prohibiting female-female sexual relationships. In 2006, the Zimbabwean national legislature introduced and passed a "Sexual Deviancy Law," which criminalizes actions that the general public could perceive as being homosexual. This law makes a prison sentence possible for anyone seen in public kissing, holding hands, or even hugging a member of the same sex. 111 This revision of the criminal code further incorporated a subjective component to the common law definition of male sodomy, expanding the realm of prohibited conduct from sexual activity to "any act involving contact between two males that would be regarded by a reasonable person as an indecent act." 112 This law operates as a broad ban on any public and semi-public expression of same-sex intimacy or even friendship. 113 ¶39 Public persecution of openly gay individuals, and those suspected of being gay or sympathetic to the plight of gay people, is pervasive in Zimbabwe. One of the most active perpetrators of inflammatory antigay rhetoric is President Robert Mugabe, who has repeatedly stoked antigay attitudes during his twenty-five year rule. 114 In addition to casting aspersions against gays and their allies in public speeches, 115 Mugabe has taken to blaming LGBT people for Zimbabwe's dire economic situation, an obfuscation that he has often fallen back on when the country's economic situation has worsened. 116 Mugabe's personal vilification of gay men and lesbians has increased the already substantial public persecution of those suspected of being gay. 117 To take just one relatively mild example, in a proclamation made during Zimbabwe's Independence Day celebrations, Mugabe spent substantial portions of his speech attacking sexual minorities and their "western colonialist supporters." He said, in part:
[Homosexuality] degrades human dignity. It's unnatural, and there is no question ever of allowing these people to behave worse than dogs and pigs. If dogs and pigs do not do it, why must human beings? We have our own culture, and we must rededicate ourselves to our traditional values that make us human beings. What we are being persuaded to accept is subanimal behavior and we will never allow it here. If you see people parading themselves as lesbians and gays, arrest them and hand them over to the police! 118 ¶40 Mugabe is not alone in his antigay rhetoric, nor in his explicit calls for individuals to further marginalize LGBT people. Mugabe's Local Government Minister, Ignatius Chombo, urged traditional chiefs 119 in May 2012 to "banish people who support homosexuality" from their communities and take away their land. 120 
¶41
Mugabe's stranglehold on power in Zimbabwe came to an end in 2008, upon his entering into a power-sharing agreement with opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai. 121 LGBT rights activists viewed this as an opportunity, as Tsvangirai had refrained from gay-bashing rhetoric, despite some public support for antigay laws, 122 and had made statements beginning in early 2011 leading activists to infer his support for some gay rights, including anti-discrimination measures. 123 This belief proved correct-as Mugabe and Tsvangirai's power sharing agreement continued and their two parties agreed to a convention to rewrite the nation's constitution, Tsvangirai announced his support for constitutionalizing sexual orientation as a protected status. 124 Tsvangirai's fellow lawmakers did not share his beliefs, 125 and Mugabe remained intractably and vocally opposed, 126 as did several other key Zimbabwean stakeholders, including the two cochairs of the Constitution Select Committee, Edward Mkhosi and Paul Mangwana, who were quoted as saying "We were all agreed that Zimbabwe is not a country that makes friends with gays." 127 ¶42
As the constitutional convention continued, with the debate shifting from inclusion of positive rights to a question of whether LGBT issues would be further criminalized or simply ignored, 128 the number of participants in the debate over LGBT rights increased. Some international human rights groups engaged, though many that might otherwise involve themselves were focused on blocking the Ugandan Anti-Homosexuality Bill or, later in 2012, leaning on the Malawian government and President Banda to repeal their sodomy law. The debate in Zimbabwe was somewhat quieter, perhaps because it began as a push for positive rights, and failed to become the impetus for a discriminatory measure until later in the process. Substantial international pressure was exerted, however, by United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, who explicitly called on the Zimbabwean government to codify some rights for LGBT people, going so far as to broach the question during her first-ever trip to the country. 129 Her call, however, was rejected, and publicly so-the Zimbabwean Justice Minister, Patrick Chinamasa, meeting Pillay at the start of her trip, told her during an open meeting that the country would continue to arrest gays and lesbians for same-sex activity. 130 
¶43
The draft constitution, initially seen as an opportunity to override the country's statutory and common law bans on same-sex activity, eventually became another mechanism by which to enshrine discrimination. Rather than maintain the laws on the books, and leave the constitution silent on LGBT issues, those opposed to gay rights instead constitutionalized the criminal ban on homosexual conduct. support for some gay rights from Tsvangirai, the constitutional convention managed to further erode the legal protections of LGBT persons in Zimbabwe, leaving them in a more precarious and dangerous position than when the debate began. 132
IV. CONTEXTUALIZING THESE THREE PIECES OF HOMOSEXUALITY LEGISLATION
A. Uganda's Downward Ratchet ¶44 Uganda's Anti-Homosexuality Bill is singular, not for its inclusion of the death penalty, present in legal codes elsewhere, 133 but for its ban on pro-LGBT activities. The public focus on the death penalty component of the measure 134 has obfuscated a necessary analysis of the effects the Bill would have, if passed in its present form, on the political strategies of pro-LGBT groups and cultural integration by LGBT persons. Uganda's insistence on banning activities that could prove positive for nascent pro-LGBT political and social spaces creates a downward ratchet, eliminating any chance of social progress by banning the advocacy and political mechanisms by which such progress can be achieved.
¶45
Further, despite its failure to actually pass the Bill, the Ugandan parliament has succeeded, in several ways, in causing immense harm to LGBT persons in Uganda and abroad. MPs Bahati and Kadaga have helped foment widespread antigay activities within Uganda, 135 forcing many LGBT Ugandans to choose between emigration, life in refugee camps that are no more welcoming to LGBT persons than Uganda is, 136 and staying in the country with targets constantly on their backs. The mere suggestion that a person is non-heterosexual can cause violent reprisal. 137 Beyond Uganda's border, though, Bahati and Kadaga's newfound popularity and their rise in political prominence has encouraged politicians in countries throughout Africa to introduce their own versions of the AntiHomosexuality Bill. This reveals an insidious and surprising modeling effect-even without securing passage for the Bill in Uganda's parliament, Bahati and his allies, including antigay international figures, 138 have succeeded in helping pass incredibly regressive statutes limiting the rights of sexual minorities in Africa.
Entrenchment and Preclusion ¶46
Uganda's Anti-Homosexuality Bill Part II, sections 7-11 proscribe up to a sevenyear prison term for those who assist others in homosexual activity. 139 As noted in Part II.A of this paper, such a provision eradicates pro-LGBT activities, and perhaps even pro-LGBT statements, from the political and cultural commons. ¶47
Though this provision makes only three lines of the statute, 140 it speaks volumes of its purpose and reach. Even at its least intrusive, the threat of prison time for those who support LGBT rights will be enough to chill those supportive activities. The legislation could go so far as to prohibit sympathetic policymakers from even introducing legislation that seeks to normalize or decriminalize some forms of homosexual behavior-even behavior that does not arise to the level of sexual activity. The law's language does not merely ban those who assist others in same-sex sexual activity, but, more broadly, those who support the "promotion of homosexuality," 141 which could be read to include nearly anything that espouses a viewpoint that does not outwardly and forcefully vilify LGBT persons. Though it remains to be seen how Ugandan courts would interpret such a statute, the threat alone is a powerful deterrent.
¶48
These provisions of the law serve as a one-way ratchet, vilifying and criminalizing the very activities that could serve to rollback the statute. Pushing a law that would remove portions of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill could violate the very terms of Part II of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill. 142 Even if the courts were remiss to allow charges against legislators, any form of public advocacy for a similar rollback would similarly run afoul of the Bill's prohibitions. The Bill serves, therefore, as a form of non-rebuttable lawmaking, entrenching such laws and binding future legislatures by the whims of the current body. Beyond the theoretical, the law and its threats serve to marginalize and stigmatize current and future pro-LGBT rights allies who would otherwise risk being ostracized, but perhaps not prison, to speak out in favor of LGBT rights. In a nation jealousy or politically-motivated attacks, as with the accusations of homosexuality leveled against Uganda's famous pastor Robert Kayanja by fellow pastors.") (emphasis added). where only 5 percent of persons are willing to privately tell a pollster that they support the rights of LGBT persons to live their lives 143 -in their own homes, not in publicwithout the threat of prison time, such a reversion could serve to push the few non-LGBT allies of sexual minority rights away from publicly supportive activism.
¶49
Lengthy prison terms for open and "aggravated" 144 homosexuality further serves to eliminate the nascent institutional structures built by LGBT persons and their allies. Groups such as Sexual Minorities Uganda ("SM-UG") and others, fighting for both cultural integration and political legitimacy, 145 would be impeded in public and private ways. Publicly, their outspoken leaders would face jail time. Privately, even those who would rent space to groups such as SM-UG would risk their own jail sentences under Part III(11) of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill, which bans anyone from "keep[ing] a house, room, set of rooms or place of any kind for purposes of homosexuality" and which is punishable by up to seven years of imprisonment. 146 No matter the external forces and funding supporting advocacy groups, a fully-implemented and enforced AntiHomosexuality Bill, as written, would prevent these organizations from openly operating within Ugandan borders. 147 
¶50
As these organizations may be forced to take flight, so may individual LGBT Ugandans. Though other nations also have harsh punishment for violations of their socalled sexual morality statutes, the penalties will almost undoubtedly be lighter than under the AHB, and might also be less often enforced. This would mean a contraction in underground, private social spaces that serve to provide support and encouragement for LGBT persons-the underground gay bar, the quietly supportive neighbor, or the local coffee shop that serves as a "safe space" for all comers, regardless of sexual orientation or identity.
¶51
Members of the LGBT community in Uganda, however, have proven to be boldly public in their activism, despite the threat of violence and harm that could befall them, going so far as to host an LGBT Pride parade outside Kampala during debate over the Anti-Homosexuality Bill. 148 Some, like SM-UG Director Pepe Onziema, ascribe this fearlessness to slain activist David Kato. 149 Even those known for remarkable bravery, however, have publicly stated their fear of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill, which would serve as a game-changer, 150 turning mere marginalization into a license to arrest and commit violence against any known or suspected sexual minority. Frank Mugisha, one of Uganda's most publicly recognizable LGBT activists, stated emphatically that were the Bill to pass, he would be convicted of aggravated homosexuality. Before the removal of the death penalty provision, he was asked what would happen were the bill to pass. He stated, simply, "I'd be sentenced to death." 151 2. Failed Bill, Successful Model ¶52 As it has since Mr. Bahati first introduced it in 2009, the Anti-Homosexuality Bill failed to clear Uganda's parliament before the end of the 2012 legislative session. In most circumstances, this continued inability to pass the AHB would denote a policymaking failure. ¶53
However, the AHB is not an ordinary policy, and its failure at home did not discourage other legislative bodies from attempting to pass similar measures in their own jurisdictions. Viewing the increase in both power and popularity that Bahati and Kadaga saw following their respective introductions of the AHB and the attendant benefits it has had in raising their international profiles amongst political figures who oppose homosexuality, other legislators in various African jurisdictions have modeled laws after Uganda's AHB. This has marked Uganda's failed statute as particularly uncommon-it is a bill that has proven itself a successful model abroad while simultaneously, and repeatedly, failing to pass domestically. Such a law, encouraged by its short-term political benefits for those pushing the provision without any indication of its effects post-implementation, is particularly dangerous.
¶54
Both David Bahati and Rebecca Kadaga have seen their popularity and power skyrocket following their introduction of Anti-Homosexuality Bills. Prior to his actions on the original AHB in 2009, Bahati was a backbencher in parliament who had failed to distinguish himself as a legislator or opinion leader, and has risen to become Chief Deputy Whip in parliament. 152 Kadaga had similarly failed to crack the upper echelon of Uganda's ruling elite, relegated to a disorganized Parliament but without a governing portfolio in the most recent governing administrations. Leadership on the AntiHomosexuality Bill, however, led to several changes in each of their circumstances. For both, work on the Bill resulted in widespread public acclaim. This increased popularity transcended social issues into other realms-Bahati leading the policy arm of the National Resistance Movement (NRM), which dominates Uganda's parliament, 153 and Kadaga becoming the front-runner to replace Museveni as President. 154 Further, working on the Bill linked both Bahati and Kadaga to an international network of antihomosexuality activists, including religious leaders from the United States, Europe, and Asia, 155 which increased their international profiles and might provide future funding and organizational capabilities.
¶55
This widespread popularity did not go unnoticed. Even before the Ugandan parliament voted on the Anti-Homosexuality Bill, backbench parliamentarians elsewhere introduced copycat legislation. 156 Unencumbered by the international focus directed at Uganda and reluctant national leadership, those bills managed to pass parliament and became law; these are unlikely to be the only pieces of legislation inspired by Uganda's AHB. These victories, and the popular support experienced by Uganda's politicians, are even encouraging antigay activity in the bulwark of pro-LGBT laws on the continent, South Africa. There, members of the Congress of Traditional Leaders have begun an attempt to weaken the sexual orientation provision in the Equality Clause of the South African Bill of Rights. 157 ¶56 Antigay activists face minimal losses when introducing bills similar to the AHB. If the bill is successful, it enacts a change popular with the general public. If unsuccessful, there is little political cost, other than possible outcry from the international community. The focus on the death penalty component of Uganda's legislation and the general silence while Nigeria and Senegal passed laws virtually identical to Uganda's revised statute show that risk to be a minimal one, unless nations like the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden and Australia follow through with threats to cut international aid to countries that discriminate against sexual minorities. 158 Further, if unsuccessful yet popular, any proposed law could prove itself an additional model for prospective implementation in other nations. Repeated attempts at passing antigay legislation could in fact serve as laboratories, encouraging experimentation to find out what could possibly pass elsewhere. Because of widespread public disapproval of homosexuality and the various provisions that could be included in such laws-including "aiding and abetting" provisions, anti-renting provisions, mandatory disclosure rules, and myriad others not yet contemplated by the AHB-Africa has proven itself a particularly apt location to serve as a laboratory for anti-LGBT legislation.
B. Malawi: Movement in Fits and Starts-But a Start Nonetheless ¶57
As noted above, were Malawi to actually decriminalize homosexuality, it would be path-breaking-the first nation since South Africa on the African continent to do so, and the first to do so by stand-alone legislation rather than in the face of a court decree. 159 However, the means by which it has undertaken debate over decriminalization are common to many other nations that have begun a similar transition from criminalization to legalization. The short period of time between Banda's call for action and the proposed bill's ultimate death showed the common traits of the legalization trajectory, including stakeholder infighting, misinformation, and opposition mobilization, all culminating in a failed first legalization attempt. 160 Malawi's experience, however, serves to highlight two emerging questions in the push for same-sex rights in Africa. First, how big a role does the support of a popular politician play in pushing forward the movement for LGBT rights, despite widespread opposition to those rights among the country's civilian population? Second, would codification of LGBT rights in Malawi allow the nation to serve as a model for similar pushes around the continent, or would observers view it as an outlier?
1. Joyce Banda's Critical Role ¶58 A fundamental question that has yet to be answered is whether Banda's call for legalization marks a first attempt-or the only attempt-at achieving some semblance of rights recognition for LGBT persons in the country. In the several months since the bill's failure, Banda has again walked back her call for her governing majority to take up the question of LGBT rights, much to the ire of human rights activists on the ground 161 but with little notice from the international community, which continues to praise her initial "courageous move" on behalf of LGBT Malawians. 162 Banda's initial call for decriminalization for sexual minorities was met with praise from international donors such as Britain and the United States, who had previously expressed disappointment and threatened to pull investment from the country due to former President Mutharika's unsavory human rights record. 163 The international praise of President Banda, from foreign leaders and human rights organizations, has been continual since her announcement. But follow-through on her part is critical if Malawi's LGBT community can hope for legal recognition.
¶59
Several factors point to President Banda's statement in favor of decriminalizing homosexuality being an actual belief and goal rather than merely a giveaway to the international community. 164 First is the forum in which she made her statement-her first address as President, made to lawmakers and citizens rather than foreign leaders. 165 Second is her continual reinforcement of that statement in additional public speeches and during questions from the media. Thirdly, and most critically, is her administration's public announcement, after the bill's first failure before parliament, that it would bypass parliament and suspend all arrests for violations of the various laws impacting LGBT persons. 166 That the government ultimately walked back this statement a week later does not prove it was anything but a genuine expression of a policy goal (albeit a policy which lacked the support of the country's legal scholars 167 and Banda's own parliamentarians, who might be convinced to support a bill but were not convinced to support unilateral action by her administration).
¶60
Determining the nature of Banda's support for the underlying idea of decriminalization is critical because Banda herself is critical to some version of the law's passage. The public support of national leaders has been a necessary, though insufficient, 168 condition for the passage of legislation which protects sexual minorities not only in Africa, 169 but around the world. 170 This is particularly cogent when considering the lack of public support for the bill. Decriminalization could not win a popular vote in Malawi, as it would not across much of Africa. But were Banda to exert pressure on MPs aligned with her ruling majority to support the bill, such a law could pass. Banda's experience negotiating the Malawian parliament to pass her signature domestic violence bill in 1998 provides her with critical experience in pushing a bill facing opposition from powerful lobbies.
¶61
No matter what form a law strengthening LGBT rights might take, the unpopularity of the policy across the Malawian populace requires either the intervention and support of a national figure or the use of the courts. Were Banda to give up the attempt to decriminalize, hopes for passage of a law would regress from small to virtually nonexistent.
A Model or an Outlier? The Possible Effects of Passage ¶62
Were Malawi to pass a decriminalization law, the question remains whether it would serve as an international model for similar legislation across the continent and the globe, perhaps serving as a check against the modeling power of Uganda's AntiHomosexuality campaign, 171 or establishing Malawi as an outlier and a slightly more welcoming place to be LGBT, but one that is unique amongst its neighbors. While the widespread regional unpopularity of legislation protecting sexual minorities might prevent it from serving as a direct model for similar legislation (at least in the short term), passage of any decriminalization measure would provide myriad benefits in the shortand long-terms to those pushing for similar laws in Africa and abroad-benefits that could improve the lives of tens of thousands of LGBT people.
i) The Passage of a Decriminalization Law Would Provide Proof that Legislation is Possible ¶63
The clearest and most intuitive effect that the passage of a decriminalization bill in Malawi's parliament would have is to show that such legislation is possible despite overwhelming public opposition. It is easy for many to dismiss South Africa as proof, for various reasons: the explicit recognition of sexual orientation protection in the constitution, the use of the Fourie case which demanded that parliament legalize samesex marriage, and the more vibrant and public gay community present in the country. books) would be temporary and subject to the whims of the party (and leader) in power, but would nonetheless showcase an improvement in the lives of sexual minorities and LGBT persons-the ability to live without fear of arrest. Such a moratorium could be used by human rights activists and supporters as a fallback were legislation to fail. ¶65 Perceptually, the passage of any pro-LGBT law, or the repeal of any antigay statute by legislation, would serve to change the narrative of LGBT rights on the African continent especially in the face of losses in Uganda, Senegal, and Nigeria. 172 Even a brief respite from the overwhelming momentum of new antigay statutes would provide some semblance of hope for LGBT individuals, international human rights actors engaged in the work of assisting sexual minorities, and activists working on the ground.
ii) The Passage of a Decriminalization Law Would Empower Grassroots
LGBT Organizations ¶66
In the face of public vitriol and continual demonization by political leaders and other public figures, nascent LGBT rights organizations continue to exist across the African continent, working to change both policy and public perception despite minimal funding and virtually non-existent public support. 173 Public leaders of such groups risk personal and professional marginalization, violence, and even death for their roles in pushing for cultural change.
¶67
The ability to point to a clear and specific victory for the rights of sexual minorities, in a country other than South Africa, would serve to empower these grassroots actors. A victory would provide a framework by which to seek positive legislative change. As a result of minimal resources, few volunteers, and public demonization, a number of LGBT grassroots organizations have been forced into playing constant defense-working to prevent the passage of antigay laws, or fighting back against the untrue and hateful public statements made against LGBT people by leaders and other officials. For many activists who sense the difficulty (if not impossibility) of passing their own protective laws, such work has become the default. Moving from this persistent defense to attempting positive legislation, even if such legislation is unlikely to pass, could reap a number of benefits, including laying the groundwork for future laws serving to protect the interests of sexual minorities. 174 
¶68
Actual passage of a pro-LGBT law in Malawi would improve the lives of countless Malawians who live in fear of arrest and jail time simply for openly living their lives. Such a law would also provide one successful framework that activists and the international community could point to as a model for efforts to decriminalize sexual orientation or push for positive rights for LGBT people in other countries on the continent. Though it may not have a modeling effect to the same degree as the populist anti-homosexuality laws passed by Uganda and Zimbabwe, it would serve to break the chain of losses for pro-LGBT forces in Africa, serving as a minor yet fundamental shift in the way in which laws protecting sexual minorities are enacted and enforced.
C. Zimbabwe: Persecution in the Face of a Push for Protection ¶69
Widespread public opposition to homosexuality, fomented by institutional and political actors, caused Zimbabwe's turn against enshrining gay rights in the constitution and made the inclusion of anti-discrimination language almost impossible. Further, the new constitution was the first document written wholly by Zimbabweans as a replacement document to the Independence Constitution of 1979, 175 entered into during negotiations with the British government upon Zimbabwe's declaration of independence-negotiations that were widely seen as dominated by the British representatives. 176 Zimbabweans of all political stripes viewed the development of this new constitution as a chance to produce a truly Zimbabwean document, making populist statements of culture and belief particularly salient. 177 
¶70
But what is most troubling about Zimbabwe's rapid push to constitutionalize antigay policies is the context in which such a push arose-as a direct response to a campaign by gay and human rights activists, flanked by their several allies in government and society, to override the statutory and common law bans on same-sex activity. Though inserting sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination into national and subnational constitutions is still remarkably common, such a ban arising in the context of a push to protect gay rights is uncommon. It requires institutional and public buy-in against the LGBT community, 178 along with the organizational aptitude to turn blowback against gay rights into a groundswell of support for antigay policies. 179 And it speaks to a broader lesson that continued engagement and diligence in defense against antigay laws, both by local activists and international organizations, is necessary even when efforts are being put into passing pro-LGBT policies. public disapproves, 180 it is rarer to find cases where a push for an ostensibly pro-gay law, to be enacted through the legislature instead of via judicial decree, has resulted in a successful counter-attempt by antigay forces to not only defeat the law but also to pass their own anti-LGBT policy instead. Several of these examples 181 come from jurisdictions that support vibrant forms of direct democracy, allowing an organized opposition to foment antigay attitudes into an overwhelming public vote for an antigay position. 182 Still others came after decisions by international bodies that allowed opponents of gay rights to assert arguments about sovereignty and tradition in a way that compelled legislators and stoked public opinion. 183 ¶72 But Zimbabwe's form-mobilizing antigay activist organizations from both within the country and abroad, including religious leaders, 184 while fomenting public opinion 185 to convince parliamentarians to reject LGBT protections and instead further codify discrimination-is particularly unique. It flies in the face of myriad countries that have taken up the question of gay rights and voted no-whether due to public opinion, personal beliefs of legislative leaders, or simply as a matter of politics-without drafting and passing a measure that would further disable LGBT persons under the law. Countries well known, 194 resulting in Mkhosi and other ostensible Tsvangirai allies shifting their prior support for the proposed anti-discrimination provision to opposition. As the drafters wished the new constitution to represent the views of the Zimbabwean public, opponents of the measure encouraged their supporters to come out forcefully not just against the draft measure, but also for a new constitutional ban on same-sex activity. Such a ban would prevent Tsvangirai or others from changing the already-existing statutory ban in the future and ensure that any change to the constitution would need to be combined with widespread public support-something anti-LGBT actors felt, rightfully so, would be slow to materialize. 195 
¶74
The constitutional codification came as a shock to international LGBT rights groups, who had cheered Tsvangirai's support for anti-discrimination measures and had lauded the formation of new LGBT rights organizations on the ground in the country, including GALZ and the Sexual Rights Centre, two of the central backers of the proposed pro-gay amendment. 196 Despite the international community watching, opponents of gay rights felt that defeating the measure alone would not be enough. Passing its own discriminatory measure in the constitutional convention would serve to silence gay rights advocates in Zimbabwe and elsewhere and provide a framework for antigay advocates in other countries to follow as laws came up for a vote that might loosen, even slightly, the limitations placed on sexual minorities. That organizations did not recognize the possibility that pushing a pro-LGBT measure in this context could make anti-LGBT entrenchment possible, or that they did recognize this possibility and did not do enough to guard against it, can only be described as failures.
The International Impact of the Zimbabwean Strategy ¶75
The international impact of this new strategy could be particularly stark. Antigay activists have begun coordinating their work on an international scale in the same manner that pro-gay groups have been for the past several decades. 197 With possible pro-LGBT bills coming up in a number of African states in the near future, the blowback strategy employed in Zimbabwe imparts an additional complication to the risk analysis already undertaken by LGBT rights groups when determining whether to push for legal recognition-the risk that pushing forward becomes a rallying cry for antigay forces to organize a campaign to further erode whatever meager protections do exist for sexual minorities in the country. In nations where homosexuality is not outlawed but where public support for gay rights is low, this risk is acute-a push to move gay and lesbian persons out of the cover of darkness could result in new laws that do not simply further marginalize gays, but instead makes their orientation illegal.
¶76
As such, the LGBT rights community, both in Africa and abroad, needs to view Zimbabwe's constitutional convention as a wake-up call: the joy inherent in a homegrown gay rights group pushing for new protections quickly eroded into a sadness and fear. Zimbabwe shows the need for a new diligence previously unconsidered-the need to continue to play strong defense against antigay forces in addition to any push to move laws forward, particularly as those fighting LGBT integration in Africa become more emboldened by victories such as Zimbabwe.
V. CONCLUSION ¶77
Uganda's 2009 Anti-Homosexuality Bill and its further iterations opened the floodgate for homosexuality legislation in Africa. What once was a relic of colonial lawmaking has taken on a populist character, with political leaders using the widespread public disapproval of homosexuality to pass laws strengthening penalties for even the most minor forms of homosexual activity.
¶78
The legislation attempted in Uganda and Malawi, along with the constitutional change ultimately enacted in Zimbabwe, allow for a comparative analysis of the present and future state of homosexuality legislation on the continent. Each illuminates the populist character of sexuality legislation, including the political gains that can be derived by opposing LGBT persons and the political penalty facing even popular politicians who stand up for minimal legal protections for the LGBT community. The laws themselves show three possible ways forward for African nations who engage in such legislation.
¶79
The Ugandan model is a deeply troubling one. By enacting and enforcing strict penalties for private sexual activity, and draconian ones for "aggravated" and public work toward LGBT equality, it vilifies and marginalizes an already vulnerable group of LGBT people. Beyond this, the law's ban on pro-LGBT activities precludes public advocacy and even private assistance by heterosexual supporters of LGBT equality. Harsh prison sentences for those who rent rooms to LGBT persons or groups, and for those in positions of power who fail to "turn in" known homosexuals, make future progress structurally difficult. Even though the law did not pass, its populist appeal has served to model 197 See Kaoma, supra note 184; cf. Marc Epprecht, Constitution Process and Sexual Minority Rights in Zimbabwe, SOLIDARITY PEACE TRUST (June 21, 2012), http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/1226/theconstitution-process-and-sexual-minority-rights-in-zimbabwe/ (describing the newfound power of American evangelicals who attempt to bring reparative therapy to the African continent, and who lend, in Epprecht's words, "a cloak of moderation or pseudo-scientific validity to the denial of human rights [to LGBT persons in Africa]."). similar regressive legislation across the continent-a rare example of "bootstrapping down" human rights. ¶80
The Malawian model presents hope for those seeking positive legislation for LGBT persons. The support of popular leaders like Joyce Banda is necessary for the passage of both decriminalization measures and positive rights. Despite public disapproval of homosexuality and LGBT rights that neared 90 percent, Malawi's ruling party managed a temporary majority of votes in parliament for a gay rights law. Though it resulted in no legal progress for LGBT persons, it serves as a model for other sympathetic leaders and groups of LGBT activists who hope to push for rights and recognition across the continent. ¶81
Finally, the Zimbabwean model shows the pitfalls of the strategy encouraged by Malawi's success-LGBT rights groups, playing on offense instead of defense, pushing for gay rights and galvanizing the opposition resulting in regressive antigay legislation. Zimbabwe's failed attempt to pass a pro-LGBT measure in 2012 serves as a wake-up call to the risks attendant to a strategy of pushing unpopular legislation. The entrenchment of antigay language in the new Zimbabwean constitution was a surprising and unfortunate result of the push to make Zimbabwe the second nation in Africa to enshrine gay rights in its constitution. The strategic shift of antigay opponents in Zimbabwe calls for pro-LGBT groups to remain zealously focused not just on those nations fighting against antigay bills, but also on those nations fighting for equality measures, as the demarcation lines between these two categories has been blurred by Zimbabwe's experience.
¶82
The three ways forward shown by Uganda, Malawi, and Zimbabwe are by no means the only ways forward. But they are critical models for both pro-LGBT and antigay forces engaging in the current debate over homosexuality legislation in Africa. Even if they fail to pass, these laws will likely continue to percolate across the continent. They are publicly popular and have served to increase the political standing of the legislators who have introduced them. Even if the laws fail to pass, they provide minimal risk to the legislators bringing them forward, and in some cases, much reward. Stopping such laws will require a country, other than South Africa, to serve as a model. Malawi may be that model, or it may not; either way, the pervasive societal disapproval of homosexuality across Africa will demand that some political leaders take concerted positions against such laws while having the wherewithal to maintain that position in the face of popular disagreement and its attendant effects to their political standing. Until such a political leader emerges and a nation passes even a symbolically pro-LGBT law, the lesson learned from homosexuality legislation passed in Zimbabwe and Uganda will be that such bills serve as a relatively easy, risk-free way to increase one's political standing while causing severe harm to LGBT persons already marginalized by the government and populace.
